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DEMOGRAPHY AND DEMOCRACY
PHYLLIS GOLDFARB*
Introduction

During oral arguments in Shelby County v. Holder, 1 Justice Antonin
Scalia provoked audible gasps from the audience when he observed that in 2006
Congress had no choice but to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act, because it had
become “a racial entitlement.” 2 Later in the argument, Justice Sonia Sotomayor
obliquely challenged Scalia’s surprise comment, eliciting a negative answer from
the attorney for Shelby County to a question about whether “the right to vote”
was “a racial entitlement.” 3 As revealed by these dueling remarks from the
highest bench in the land, demography and democracy are linked in the public
consciousness of Americans, but in dramatically different ways.
Minority voters have learned from decades of experience that in a number
of jurisdictions, the Voting Rights Act is nearly synonymous with their
unfettered ability to vote. 4 Without the Act, their right to vote, American
democracy’s fundamental precept, would be compromised to a far greater
degree. 5 So although Justice Scalia stated that, in his view, the Voting Rights
Act had become a racial entitlement, that could only be because minority voters
knew—as Congressional findings confirmed—that it was necessary to protect
their access to the ballot. 6 The powerful evidence of the Act’s indispensability in
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1 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2 Oral Argument at 51:57, Shelby County. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), available
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/2019/2012/2012_12_96http://www.oyez.org/cases/20102019/2012/2012_12_96#argument.
3 Id. at 70:01.
4 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2634 (2013) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (asserting
that the Voting Rights Act “wrought dramatic changes in the realization of minority voting
rights”).
5 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (the “political franchise of voting” is a
“fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights”). See also Joshua Field,
Creating a Federal Right to Vote, Center for American Progress (June 25, 2013),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2013/06/25/67895/creating-a-federalright-to-vote/ (explaining how gutting the Voting Rights Act cripples minorities’ right to vote).
6 H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 6 (2006) (“Discrimination today is more subtle than the visible
methods used in 1965...the effect and results are the same, namely a diminishing of the minority
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protecting racial minorities’ voting rights explains why Justice Sotomayor may
have understood Scalia’s comment to refer to voting, rather than the Voting
Rights Act, as “a racial entitlement.” 7 Given this understanding, her implicit
rejoinder, which suggested that the essence of democracy depended on voting not
varying by demography, was not in any way a non-sequitur.
This unusual, though indirect, colloquy from the bench between two
Supreme Court justices will frame this essay. In Part I, I give context to the
perspectives that underlie Scalia’s assertion and Sotomayor’s implied reply. 8 In
Part II, I look at how the Supreme Court majority’s rhetoric in its Shelby County
opinion reflects perspectives consistent with Scalia’s. 9 In Part III, I explore the
meaning of these perspectives for Supreme Court justices who preside over cases
in an America riven by a vehement partisan divide. 10
The essay concludes with observations about the fragility of democracy in
a world where changing demographics heighten the role of partisanship. 11 My
hope is that efforts to diagnose the nature of the impediments to voting rights
will help generate ideas for bolstering our teetering democracy, now that the
Supreme Court has dashed the most effective part of the most effective piece of
civil rights legislation that Congress ever enacted. 12
I.

CONTEXT

Journalists reporting on the oral arguments in Shelby County v.
Holder typically described Justice Scalia’s comment as but one more example
of the self-appointed provocateur at work, as Scalia being Scalia. 13 Whether
or not this adequately characterizes the Shelby County oral argument’s gaspinducing moment, the news accounts shed little light on how to understand
the substance of Scalia’s remark. If minority voters expected Congress in
community’s ability to fully participate in the electoral process and to elect their preferred
candidates.”).
7 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 13 - 42 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 43 - 73 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 74 - 93 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 78 - 95 and accompanying text.
12 In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts admits that race discrimination in voting has been
significantly reduced due to enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. See Shelby County v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) (“The Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial
discrimination and integrating the voting process.”). In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg
refers to the Voting Rights Act as “one of the most consequential, efficacious, and amply justified
exercises of federal legislative power in our Nation’s history.” Id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
13 See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly, Voting Rights Act Supreme Court Case: Scalia Condemns The
‘Perpetuation Of Racial Entitlement’, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/27/voting-rights-act-supreme-curt_n_2768942.html.
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2006 to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it was because minority
voters knew that race-based inequities persisted in voting processes. 14 They
also knew that Congress, compelled by the gruesome acts of those who sought
to maintain a Jim Crow system of elections, had committed itself more than
forty years earlier to ameliorating these inequities 15 by “appropriate
legislation,” as it had been authorized to do a century earlier in the language
of the Fifteenth Amendment. 16 Accordingly, these expectations of minority
voters, were not, as Scalia implied, grounded in a desire to accumulate
undeserved benefits, but in an awareness of the continuing need, confirmed
by abundant evidence and experience, to secure the most basic rights of
citizenship. 17
A. Protecting Democratic Values
Were there no race-based discrimination in voting, no connection
between demography and democracy, the Voting Rights Act would be obsolete.
In 2006, after studying the issue at length, hearing extensive testimony, and
producing a voluminous record, Congress determined that voting—the
essential building block of a democratic system—was still being manipulated
in a racialized manner. 18 As a result of the evidence presented, Congress
concluded that the Voting Rights Act had been a useful tool in protecting
Fifteenth Amendment rights, and that due to ongoing efforts to undermine
these hard-won rights, reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act remained
necessary to protect the basic democratic principle that each person,
regardless of his or her demographic group, has an equal right to vote. 19

See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S Ct. 2612, 2628 (2013) (explaining that Congress drafted and
maintained the Voting Rights Act because “the reign of Jim Crow denied African-Americans the
most basic freedoms,” and “state and local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise
citizens on the basis of race”).
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”).
17 The imagery of undeserved benefits accruing to African-Americans has become a familiar trope
in the backlash to periods of African-American progress. This is one way to understand the
racialized resistance to affirmative action and welfare that followed civil rights victories. See
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 48-49 (2010). Scalia’s comment seems to suggest that
voting rights legislation is like busing, affirmative action, and government entitlements programs
that, in recent decades, conservatives have portrayed as liberal largesse unduly granting special
preferences to African-Americans at the expense of an innocent and more deserving white
majority. See generally THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991) (describing how the civil rights
movement led to conservatives’ organized advocacy in opposition to federal programs that
benefitted African-Americans).
18 See H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 56 (2006) (“Forty years has been an insufficient amount of time to
address the century during which racial minorities were denied the full rights of citizenship.”).
19 See id. at 117-18 (“Discrimination in the electoral process continues to exist and threatens to
undermine the progress that has been made over the last 40 years.”).
14
15
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Commentators have widely praised the Voting Rights Act as the high
water mark of meaningful Congressional action on behalf of civil rights. 20
While these commentators are praising the substance of the legislation, and
its positive impact on American democracy, it is also worth noting that the
Voting Rights Act represents a democratic model in another sense as well.
The initial passage and reauthorization process of the Voting Rights Act is an
exemplar of a responsible legislative process. 21 The image of a bipartisan
Congress carefully studying a social problem, and enacting, then re-enacting,
bipartisan legislation that can productively address it, eludes us in 2015. 22
In process terms too, the Voting Rights Act represents a contemporary value
that we now know we cannot take for granted.
B. Whose Racial Entitlement?
Why would a piece of legislation as successful as the Voting Rights Act
in promoting our principal democratic values, both substantively and
procedurally, provoke opposition? An effort to respond to this inquiry begins
by turning Justice Scalia’s observation around. The lesson of the century
between the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment and the passage of the
Voting Rights Act was that voting, like the best schools, neighborhoods, and
public accommodations, had indeed become a racial entitlement—for white
majorities alone. 23 Because of its efficacy, the Voting Rights Act threatened
the white majority’s racial entitlement to exclude communities of color by
controlling access to the ballot. 24
See, e.g., Jared Ellias, The Voting Rights Act and Its Foreign Counterparts, 41 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 317 (Spring 2008) (stating “[t]he Voting Rights Act is one of the seminal pieces of
America's civil rights legislation”). See also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (calling the Voting Rights Act “the Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights legislation”).
21 See id. at 2636 (noting that Congress made findings that supported its reauthorization of the
Voting Rights Act and the coverage formula after it “held 21 hearings, heard from scores of
witnesses, received a number of investigative reports and other written documentation of
continuing discrimination in covered jurisdictions”). Justice Ginsburg described Congress as
approaching the 2006 reauthorization “with great care and seriousness.” Id. at 2644.
22 Id. at 2652 (“After exhaustive evidence-gathering and deliberative process, Congress
reauthorized the VRA, including the coverage provision, with overwhelming bipartisan support.”).
23 In the South, this was largely the century of Jim Crow. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). See also Alexander, supra note 17, at 20-57 (describing the
evolving forms of racial caste in America, from its founding to the present, designed to preserve
white supremacy); Sameer M. Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Justice O'Connor’s Blind Rationalization of
Affirmative Action Jurisprudence--Adarand Constructors, Inc. V. Pena (1995), 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 223, 223, 240 (1996) (describing how “the current distribution of power” is “skewed
substantially by race and ethnicity,” and “in favor of the white majority”).
24 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (Congress found that
“[t]he VRA has directly caused significant progress in eliminating first-generation barriers to
ballot access, leading to a marked increase in minority voter registration and turnout and the
number of minority elected officials.”).
20
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Founded while enslaving Africans and vanquishing Native peoples,
America has always connected demography to democracy. 25 In the past
century, especially in the Jim Crow South, the democratic process was
profoundly undemocratic. Potential black voters—and, even more so, those
who sought to register and organize them—risked lethal violence if they
exercised the franchise. 26 By enabling and supporting greater minority
participation in the electoral process, formerly the exclusive province of white
majorities, the Voting Rights Act undermined one of the strongholds of white
supremacy. The supremacist fortress, designed to elect government officials
who would maintain it, was left standing, but its ramparts were weakened by
the legislation. 27
For this reason, some among the white majorities may well have
experienced the Voting Rights Act as an assault on their ability to retain
their unquestioned hold on the reins of power. In regions with large minority
populations who had significant, experience-based reasons to mistrust the
status quo power structure, equal voting rights held the potential to reduce
the power of white majorities.
Those whose power is supported by
illegitimate means rarely give it up graciously.
The history of America—where demography and democracy have
always been intertwined—strongly supports the notion of voting as a racial
entitlement, but, more than for anyone else, as a racial entitlement for white
majorities. Although this was not the point made by Justice Sotomayor in
her oblique reply to Scalia, 28 she likely intended her remark to convey
another message: that cultural norms have changed. Behind her observation
that voting cannot be understood today as a racial entitlement is the
25 See Alexander, supra note 17, at 23 (“[T]he idea of race emerged as a means of reconciling
chattel slavery—as well as the extermination of American Indians—with the ideals of freedom
preached by whites in the new colonies.”).
26 Justice Roberts’ majority opinion recognizes two of these violent episodes among many: the
bloody 1965 police assault in Selma, Alabama, on marchers supporting voter registration and the
1964 murder in Philadelphia, Mississippi of three civil rights workers who were registering
African-American voters. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2626. When Ronald Reagan
launched his 1980 Presidential campaign near Philadelphia, Mississippi, he explicitly asserted his
support for state’s rights, implying his support for a return to the pre-civil rights era, in the very
area where civil rights workers Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner had been murdered in 1964.
See Bob Herbert, Righting Reagan’s Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2007).
27 See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, The Supreme Court’s Racial Double Standard in Redistricting:
Unequal Protection in Politics and the Scholarship That Defends It, 14 J. L. & POLITICS 591, 593,
597 (1998) (describing “the self-replicating political patterns of white supremacy,” reinforced by
“legal doctrines” which “change shape and form” as “the deep social and juridical reality of white
supremacy endures”).
28 Presumably, Justice Sotomayor objected to the implication in Justice Scalia’s comment that
Congress was ceding to minorities’ unwarranted demands. See Oral Argument at 70:01, Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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awareness that to enable America to overcome its profoundly racialized
history and realize its democratic promise, Congress was moved by historical
events to enact the Voting Rights Act. 29 The purpose of the Voting Rights Act,
and its continued reauthorization, was to make voting an equal opportunity
enterprise, to weaken the link between demography and democracy that had
entrusted the electoral process to nearly exclusive white control for
centuries. 30
More than two hundred years of living with the ideology of slavery had
certainly entrenched racial hierarchy as an American norm. 31 The hundred
years of post-slavery that separated the Fifteenth Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act were filled with the sort of opposition to equality that may
seem justified to those who are fighting to protect a norm that had always
organized their lives but was now being questioned and modified. 32 When a
hierarchical status quo has become the normative structure of power, a move
toward greater equality is genuinely experienced as a loss of entitlement, a
taking, a threat to a known way of life. 33 Consequently, reducing in the name
of equality the power of those who had always controlled power, and had
reason to presume their continued control, in order to share power with those
who had been denied it, was a step that some understood as an act of fairness
and others as an affront. These disparate reactions set up the war of
perceptions that pervaded the Civil Rights era. 34 A corresponding war of
perceptions—echoing in the exchange between Justices Scalia and Sotomayor,
as well as between Justice Roberts in his majority opinion and Justice

See H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 6 (2006) (“Prior to the enactment of the VRA, parts of the United
States condoned the unequal treatment of certain citizens, including denying the most
fundamental right of citizenship—the right to vote.”). See also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
at 2651-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Beyond question, the VRA is no ordinary
legislation…because Congress embarked on a mission long delayed and of extraordinary
importance: to realize the purpose and promise of the Fifteenth Amendment.”).
30 See id. at 2651 (“The grand aim of the Act is to secure to all in our polity equal citizenship
stature, a voice in our democracy undiluted by race.”).
31 See, e.g., Miri Song, Introduction: Who’s At the Bottom? Examining Claims about Racial
Hierarchy, 27 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 859 (Nov. 2004) (asserting that there is a recognized
racial hierarchy in America with whites at the top and African-Americans at the bottom).
32 See Alexander, supra note 17, at 26-40 (describing how the Jim Crow system restored white
supremacy after Reconstruction, and how conservative movements to rollback racial progress
followed the civil rights movement’s challenge to Jim Crow).
33 See, e.g., Cleo Fields & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Why the Anxiety When Blacks Seek Political
Power?, NEW ORLEANS TIME-PICAYUNE, July 23, 1996, at B5.
34 See Alexander, supra note 17, at 36-37 (“A mood of outrage and defiance swept the South [after
Brown v. Board of Education was decided], not unlike the reaction to emancipation and
Reconstruction following the Civil War. Again, racial equality was being forced upon the South by
the federal governmen).
29
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Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion—holds the fate of the Voting Rights Act in
its balance. 35
C. Federalism Issues
Generally, the war of perceptions maps directly onto principles of
federalism. The Civil War underscored a longstanding American view of
federal power as the source of the threat to the prerogatives of states. 36
Included among the prized prerogatives in many states were laws and
practices that enshrined racial hierarchy. 37 Federal troops enforcing evolving
norms of racial equality were deployed, and met resistance, during infamous
Civil Rights era incidents that unfolded in Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama,
and other jurisdictions. 38 Principles of federalism, which may hold a
legitimate place in the design of our nation, are also abstractions that can
mask the war of perceptions about power, inequality, and how they are
distributed.
The Voting Rights Act fits conveniently into the federalism debate. 39
The provision of the Voting Rights Act that the Supreme Court struck down
was the coverage formula that required the states with the most virulent
history of racialized inequality in electoral processes to seek the federal
government’s approval before changing their voting practices. 40 Although the
purpose of focusing only on these states in the coverage formula was to limit
the extent of the incursion into federalist principles by focusing only on those
jurisdictions where the use of federal power was most justified, the prudent
effort to protect federalism norms to the extent consistent with equality
norms resulted in disparate treatment of jurisdictions. 41 In Shelby County,
this prudential course earned the disapproval of a majority of the Court. 42
See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It cannot tenably be
maintained that the VRA, an Act of Congress adopted to shield the right to vote from racial
discrimination, is inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment, or any
provision of the Constitution read in light of the Civil War Amendments. Nowhere in today’s
opinion….is there clear recognition of the transformative effect the Fifteenth Amendment aimed
to achieve.”).
36 See Alfred L. Brophy, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon the Constitution: Federal-State Relations
in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 225 (1990) (noting that before the Civil War, the
“Southern constitutional theory” was that states were coequal sovereigns with the federal
government).
37 See Alexander, supra note 17, at 26 (“Federalism—the division of power between the states and
the federal government—was the device employed to protect the institution of slavery and the
political power of slaveholding states.”).
38 See Anthony J. Lewis, Eisenhower On Air, Says School Defiance Has Gravely Harmed Prestige
of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1957, at A1.
39 See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights
Act, 65 VAND. L REV. 1195 (2012).
40 Section 4 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)(2006).
41 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[Congress] had
every reason to believe that the Act’s limited geographical scope would weigh in favor of, not
35
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II.

THE MAJORITY’S RHETORIC: PARITY’S PARODY
A. Protecting Sovereignty and Federalism

Part I provides a backdrop for evaluating the rhetoric of Shelby County.
After reiterating the principle of state sovereignty, the power of states to
“retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments,” Justice Roberts
underlined the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the states,
which—although legally contestable when applied to circumstances like
these—“remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate
treatment of States.” 43 Finding that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act
“sharply departs from these basic principles” by requiring some states, but
not all states, to preclear their proposed electoral changes with federal
officials, Roberts indicated that the resulting costs to the principles of
federalism and the equal sovereignty of states were no longer sufficiently
justified in light of the improvements that Congress noted in the current
condition of the franchise in the covered jurisdictions. 44 “If [Congress] is to
divide the States,” he asserted, it must do so “on a basis that makes sense in
light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.” 45
In light of the particularly violent history of race-based voter
suppression that led to the Voting Rights Act—a history the majority briefly
acknowledges 46 —the indelicacy of the majority’s expressions of greater
concern for equality between states than for equality between people of
different races living in those states is startling. Because Southern states,
which fought to preserve their unequal voting practices, divided the
electorate on the basis of race, the Voting Rights Act divided the states into
those that sought to maintain obviously discriminatory race-based voting
practices and those that did not. 47 For people who suffered from a long
history of race-based voter suppression in those states, and despite
against, the Act’s constitutionality.”). Additional support for this proposition is found in United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a remedial section of the
Violence Against Women Act, in part because, unlike the VRA, it imposed uniform national
remedies rather than remedies tied to a particular history of discriminatory treatment).
42 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (“[D]espite the tradition of equal sovereignty,
the Act applies to only nine States (and several additional counties).”).
43 Id. at 2616.
44 Id. at 2617-2621.
45 Id. at 2622.
46 Id. at 2624 (The “blight of racial discrimination in voting” had “infected the electoral process in
parts of our country for nearly a century”) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966).
47 See Raskin, supra note 27, at 646-47 (observing that the Voting Rights Act “requires Congress
and the courts to take cognizance” of “racist practices by states” in order “to end racial vote
dilution by racist white legislatures”).
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improvements, continued to experience official actions that promoted
racialized inequality among voters, the majority’s hierarchy of equality
concerns may bear a special sting. 48
What skews the majority’s sense of equality—and their sense of
irony—to the extent that the unequal treatment of state entities disturbs
them more than the unequal treatment of minority voters? Why is the Act’s
division of the states according to the violations of democracy and equality
that they were shown to have committed considered to be a greater harm
than the states’ division of their electorate according to race and their
maintenance of unequal election laws and practices for different racial
groups?
When a majority of the Court in Bush v. Gore 49 invalidated Florida’s
recount of ballots in the contested Presidential election of 2000, it was
because there was no statewide uniform standard for accepting or rejecting
ambiguous ballots. 50 Under the Equal Protection Clause, five Justices halted
the recount based on the principle that all votes must count equally, such
that their validity could not be judged by potentially different county-bycounty standards. 51 Why did a Court, which had found equality concerns in
the potential dilution of some votes, abandon such equality concerns in
Shelby County?
It is also fair to ask why the majority’s fealty to abstract principles of
federalism trumps their fealty to competing constitutional norms of equal
protection, especially when applied to voting—the foundation for protecting
all other rights. Congress took pains to document the covered jurisdictions’
long history of impeding equal exercise of the franchise, especially but not
exclusively for African-American voters, and their continuing efforts to do

See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, A Divide on Voting Rights in a Town Where Blood Spilled, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/us/politics/a-divide-on-voting-rightswhere-blood-spilled.html?_r=0 (for a Mississippi County with a history of beatings, shootings, and
fire-bombings to keep African-Americans from the polls, support for the Voting Rights Act divides
along racial lines, with reports of descriptions of continuing “camouflaging” problems, such as
“long lines in certain neighborhoods” and “voter ID requirements” and over 100 DOJ objections
since 1982 in proposed changes to its voting practices).
49 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
50 Id. at 105 (“The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida
Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters
necessary to secure the fundamental right.”).
51 Id. at 111 (“Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems with the
recount” under the Equal Protection Clause, although two of those Justices, Souter and Breyer,
felt that the case should be remanded to the Florida Supreme Court to craft guidelines under
which the recount could proceed).
48
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so. 52 Yet once again the majority’s hierarchy of concern focused more on
harms to federalist structures than on harms to democratic structures. 53
While this constitutional ranking system has a long and unfortunate pedigree,
many had hoped that one legacy of the civil rights movement—not to mention
the Civil War—was its modification of this normative history. 54 Those
harboring this desire were devastated by the outcome of Shelby County.
B. The Use of History
The majority’s hierarchy of concerns that elevated state sovereignty
and federalism over equality and democracy was asserted even in the face of
its recognition that “no one doubts” that “voting discrimination still exists” 55
and that “any racial discrimination in voting is too much.” 56 But according to
the majority, voter discrimination was no longer sufficiently “pervasive,”
“flagrant,” “widespread,” and “rampant” to justify such an uncommon
legislative response as the Voting Rights Act. 57 As Justice Roberts’ chided
Congress and the dissenters, “history did not end in 1965.” 58
Like his peculiarly ranked concerns about the equality of states rather
than people, Roberts’ distress about inequalities and divisions between states
rather than those between citizens can read as unconscious parody. Even the
statement that “history did not end in 1965” can sound parodic, as it has an
obvious alternate meaning. 59 Roberts intended to highlight the fact that,

See H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 11 (2006)(reviewing evidence that in addition to AfricanAmericans, many language minorities—including Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, Hispanics,
and American Indians—suffer from lack of voter participation).
53 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (“[T]he fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of
States….The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles.”).
54 See Alexander, supra note 17, at 17 (noting that during the civil rights era, as during
Reconstruction, “federal troops were sent to the South to provide protection for blacks attempting
to exercise their civil rights”).
55 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2619.
56 Id. at 2631.
57 Id. at 2629.
58 Id. at 2628.
59 See id. Twice the majority opinion quotes Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U. S. 193 (2009)—a case forewarning of the Court’s distaste for the Voting Rights
Act’s coverage formula—for the proposition that in the covered jurisdictions minority turnout and
voter registration rates “now approach parity.” Id. at 2621, 2625. Because the majority ignores
Congressional findings of current discriminatory practices that dilute minority voting, see H.R.
Rep. No. 109-478, p. 6, the assertion that voting in the covered jurisdictions “approach[es] parity”
comes close, in my view, to approaching parody. Also, as Anthony Farley observes, satisfaction
with “approach[ing] parity,” rather than parity itself, suggests complacency about the voting
inequality that remains. See Anthony Paul Farley, Jackals, Tall Ships, and the Endless Forest of
52
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despite improvements in the covered states over the previous four decades,
Congress chose to retain the preclearance formula that was designed in
1965. 60 But the words “history did not end in 1965” can just as readily
highlight the fact, which Congress and the dissenters advanced, that the
history which led to the Voting Rights Act in 1965 remains with us, that
although the forms of discrimination have changed—primarily due to the
proscriptions of the Voting Rights Act—discrimination in voting remains. 61
As Justice Ginsburg notes, Congress identified second-generation inequities
in voting practices, which have replaced the first generation inequities that
animated the Voting Rights Act in 1965. 62
Of course, Justice Roberts intended his reference to history to mean
that the unusual remedial structure of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act—
designed to avoid the costs and burdens of litigation—was no longer
responsive to current conditions, but was stuck in the conditions that existed
in 1965. 63 To maintain this perspective, however, the five justices who joined
the majority needed to ignore the fact that the Voting Rights Act provided for
the updating of its coverage formula by allowing states to “bailout” of its
strictures, if they could demonstrate “clean hands” for a ten-year period. 64
Although the structure of the 1965 Act’s preclearance provision remained
intact, the existence of the bailout provision undercuts the argument that the
Voting Rights Act was stuck in 1965. 65
Moreover, while the Act’s original selection formula was based on
racial disparities in the covered jurisdictions’ voter registration, election
Lies: Foreward to Symposium on Voting Rights in the Wake of Shelby County v. Holder, TOURO
JOURNAL OF RACE, GENDER, AND ETHNICITY 1 (2015).
60 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2618 (stating that Congress reauthorized its original
coverage formula, even though “the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer
characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions”).
61 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent provides a litany of recent examples of discriminatory efforts to
impede racial equality in voting in the covered jurisdictions, offering vivid evidence that the
notorious history of racialized voter suppression remains with us. See id. at 2640-41 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
62 Justice Ginsburg gives examples of second-generation barriers such as racial gerrymandering of
legislative districts, and switching from district-by-district to at-large voting for the purpose of
diluting the impact of minority votes. Id. at 2635.
63 Id. at 2619 (majority opinion) (stating that “the Act imposes current burdens and must be
justified by current needs”) (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2006); H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 11, 25 (2006).
65 The Voting Rights Act also contains a bail-in provision, permitting a court, upon findings of
voting rights violations, to add jurisdictions to the list of those that require federal preclearance.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). See also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2644 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (after noting the number of jurisdictions that have bailed out and those that have been
bailed in by court order—Arkansas and New Mexico—Justice Ginsburg observes that “[t]his
experience exposes the inaccuracy of the Court’s portrayal of the Act as static, unchanged since
1965. Congress designed the VRA to be a dynamic statute, capable of adjusting to changing
conditions.”).
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turnout, and numbers of elected officials, the Congressional record documents
the findings of the reauthorization process that, while it has assumed new
guises, discrimination in voting practices was concentrated in the same states
that Section 4 initially selected for coverage. 66 Even if other deserving
jurisdictions were excluded from coverage, continued inclusion of the covered
jurisdictions was fully justified by the evidence of their different but
continuing discriminatory practices. 67 By insisting that Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act had become antiquated by virtue of improvements in voter
registration, election turnout, and numbers of elected officials, despite
Congressional findings that discrimination against minority voters now took
other forms, the majority demonstrated only that its interpretations, not
Congress’ actions, were mired in the past. It was the Court, not Congress,
that refused to update its thinking about what voter discrimination looks like
today.
C. Quarreling with Success
The majority failed to engage the thousands of pages of the
Congressional record as it overturned what it recognized as the country’s
premier civil rights achievement. 68 When the majority acknowledged that
the Voting Rights Act had an exceptional record of success, the Act’s efficacy
in reducing racially discriminatory voting practices in the South became part
of the rationale for abandoning it. 69 Notwithstanding Congressional findings
to the contrary and evidence of the continuing need for federal oversight,70
the majority expressed its opinion that the Act was one of the reasons that
the covered jurisdictions had changed and therefore its precautionary
measures were no longer necessary. 71

See H. R. Rep. No. 109-478 (2006).
See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2642-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (evidence of
“preclearance’s continuing efficacy in blocking constitutional violations in the covered
jurisdictions” served to ground “Congress’ conclusion that the remedy should be retained for those
jurisdictions….Congress reasonably concluded that the coverage formula continues to identify the
jurisdictions of greatest concern.”).
68 Id. at 2644 (“The Court makes no genuine attempt to engage with the massive legislative record
that Congress assembled. Instead, it relies on increases in voter registration and turnout as if
that were the whole story.”).
69 See id. at 2626 (majority opinion) (“There is no doubt that these improvements are in large part
because of the Voting Rights Act.”) (emphasis in original).
70 See H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 32, 44 (2006) (finding that there are still “indicia of
discrimination” and a need for federal oversight of voting practices in the states).
71 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2627, 2629 (“[T]he bar that covered jurisdictions
must clear has been raised even as the conditions justifying that requirement have dramatically
improved….Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled
out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions.”).
66
67
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According to Justice Roberts, the particular precautionary measures of
the Voting Rights Act were “strong medicine.” 72 Extending the metaphor,
why did the majority believe that the medicine had cured the patient, when
Congress had amassed considerable evidence supporting the view that it was
the Act itself that was suppressing the worst symptoms of the democracydisfiguring disease? 73 As with many treatments, discontinuing medicine
generally risks bringing pernicious systemic symptoms back to the fore.
Apparently, the majority saw the renewed risk of racially discriminatory
voting practices as less noxious than the continued prescription of bad-tasting
medicine.
III. DEMOGRAPHY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Shelby County undermines democratic values fundamental to our legal
system. In the name of a perverse brand of equality, a bare majority of a
court undid the unusually exhaustive and effective work of a bipartisan
legislature, which reauthorized the Voting Rights Act by an overwhelming
margin, in part because it was so successfully combating the racially
discriminatory voting practices that impede democracy. 74 How can we
understand this? Why did the Court strike at the heart of one of the most
democracy-enhancing things that Congress has ever done?
A. Racial Polarization
One possible hint may lie in a portion of the Congressional record
quoted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. Evidence presented to Congress
indicated “voting in the covered jurisdictions was more racially polarized
than elsewhere in the country.” 75 Where racially polarized voting exists,
racially discriminatory changes in voting laws have the capacity to influence
electoral outcomes. 76 When it is easy to predict that particular candidates
and parties will be favored or disfavored by minority groups, partisan reasons
emerge for adopting and sustaining racially discriminatory voting practices. 77
Id. at 2618.
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-478 (2006).
74See Ari Berman, Destroying the Voting Rights Act, THE NATION (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.nationinstitute.org/featuredwork/fellows/3144/destroying_the_voting_rights_act/?page
=entire (discussing Congressional findings on the efficacy and the need for the Voting Rights Act,
which led the Senate to vote 98-0 and the House of Representatives to vote 390-33 for its 2006
reauthorization).
75 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. at 2643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 109478, at 34-35).
76 See Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in
Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 205, 209 (2013) (describing the
correlation between political advantage and race-specific disadvantage).
77 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. at 2643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A] governing
political coalition has an incentive to prevent changes in the existing balance of voting power.
72
73
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One thing we know about our political culture today is that it features
a bitter partisan divide. 78 When the racial and ethnic identity of voters is
seen to correlate strongly with the casting of specific votes, partisan
incentives for empowered opponents to adopt discriminatory techniques that
will change election results may become too powerful to resist. Congress
considered evidence of this reality as a basis for its reauthorization of the
Voting Rights Act. 79 They were attuned to the fact that democracy becomes
even more vulnerable in an electorate that is demographically divided.
The Supreme Court is attuned to this fact as well. In 2001, in the case
of Easley v. Cromartie, 80 the Supreme Court recognized that because AfricanAmericans vote primarily for Democrats, redistricting to protect an
incumbent in a minority district was constitutional when grounded in
political reasons rather than reasons of minority empowerment. 81 This
holding has resurfaced in an inverted form in Texas’ answer to the
Department of Justice’s 2013 complaint under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act—the litigation provision not at issue in Shelby County—which
acknowledged that its Republican legislature redistricted in a way that
supported Republican candidates, claiming that any disadvantage
experienced by the candidates supported by minority voters was
“incidental.” 82 Because there is reason to fear that a majority of the Supreme
Court—the same five Justices as the Shelby County majority—will insist on
proving intentional race discrimination under Section 2, the profound

When voting is racially polarized, efforts by the ruling party to pursue that incentive ‘will
inevitably discriminate against a racial group.’”) (citing Ansolabehere, Persily & Stewart, supra
note 76).
78 See, e.g., Dante Chinni, Politics Count: Big Wins and Partisan Divides, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Oct 4, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/10/04/politics-counts-big-wins-andpartisan-divides/. See also Zachary Roth, How Section 5 blocked a GOP power grab in Texas,
MSNBC (June 6, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-section-5-blocked-goppower-grab-tex (describing how the GOP attempted to redraw district lines after losing a state
senate seat due to Democratic minority voters).
79 See H. R. Rep. No. 109-478 (2006), at 2 (“The continued evidence of racially polarized voting in
each of the jurisdictions covered by the expiring provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain politically vulnerable, warranting the
continued protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”).
80 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
81 Id. (upholding redistricting against an Equal Protection challenge because the redistricting was
due to voting behavior, not racial characteristics).
82 See Jeffrey Rosen, Eric Holder’s Suit Against Texas Gives the Supreme Court a Chance to Gut
Even More of the Voting Rights Act, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114524/eric-holder-texas-suit-supreme-court-might-gut-morevoting-rights.
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racialized effects of discriminating in a highly partisan manner may well be
held constitutional. 83
B. Bush v. Gore Redux
The Bush v. Gore majority was roundly critiqued for its appearance of
partisanship when five justices appointed by Republican Presidents decided
the case in a way that handed the 2000 Presidential election to George W.
Bush. 84 In reaching this result, the majority articulated a constitutional
requirement that all votes must count equally. 85 Yet when racially
discriminatory voting practices were at issue in Shelby County, five justices
appointed by Republican Presidents, three of whom were in the majority that
decided Bush v. Gore, lent no support to the view that all votes must count
equally. 86 Why? An uncomfortable possibility that reconciles the seeming
inconsistency between the two decisions is this: The Supreme Court’s
constitutionally rooted concern for the equality of all votes is turned on and
off in the interests of partisan ends.
Are partisan interests at work in the Supreme Court’s voting rights
jurisprudence? The reality is that supporters of conservative candidates
often know that they can benefit from the suppression of minority votes.
Because demography and democracy are dynamically interrelated, partisan
reasons to dilute minority voting strength may fuse with, and become
inseparable from, racial animus and disregard for racial equality. Racial
gerrymandering can be supported on the basis of both racial animus and
partisanship. 87 Voter identification laws can also be supported for these
reasons. 88 Challenging voters at the polls on the grounds of suspected felony
disqualification is a method for suppressing minority votes and influencing

Id.
See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Why The Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided The Presidential
Election of 2000, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 335, 345-52 (2001) (discussing how the partisan decision
could be destructive and discrediting). See also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW
THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary
Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L. J. 1407 (2001).
85 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (holding that each vote must count equally across
counties).
86 The five-member majority in Shelby County—which included Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy
from the majority of Bush v. Gore—stated that impediments “that affect the weight of minority
votes” were not the focus of the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, such that vote
dilution concerns were not constitutionally addressable by Section 4. See Shelby County v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013).
87 See Michael J. Pitts, Redistricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1616-22
(2010) (discussing the evidence of animus and partisanship in racial gerrymandering).
88 See Nihal S. Patel, Weighty Considerations: Facial Challenges and the Right To Vote, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 741, 765-66 (2010) (acknowledging the partisanship and disproportionate exclusionary
impact of voter identification laws).
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election results. 89 Reducing or eliminating early voting, locating older voting
machinery in minority districts, and placing a limited number of
inconveniently located polling places there are all tactics for minority voter
suppression that can change electoral outcomes in predictable ways. 90 Even
though it was sometimes inadequate to the demands of the task, for more
than forty years, the Voting Rights Act was the best available remedy we had
for reaching these discriminatory practices, until it was undermined by the
ruling in Shelby County.
No longer is the preventive aspect of preclearance available in any
state to combat discriminatory election laws and practices that corrupt
democracy. When Shelby County invalidated the federal oversight provided
by the administrative processes of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, the
explicit question about partisanship that scandalized the Court in Bush v.
Gore raised its ugly head once again. 91 Did a Republican-appointed
conservative majority of the Supreme Court disregard the considerable
benefits of the Voting Rights Act’s administrative review provisions because
it is too identified with, and too beholden to, partisans who operate on one
side of a political divide and gain advantage from the suppression of minority
votes? When the opportunity arises, will they gut Section 2 of the Act as well,
eliminating both the administrative and the litigation remedies that for the
past generation minority voters have relied upon? 92 When they do so, who
will argue that, despite its repeated resistance to Congress’ attempts to
protect voters of color, the Supreme Court is an impartial body of umpires
interpreting constitutional provisions in a principled, non-partisan manner?
The importance of these answers intensifies with the changing
demographics of America. At some point in the 21st century, for the first time
89 In a unanimous 1985 opinion in Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court invalidated a
provision in Alabama’s Constitution that denied the right to vote to people convicted of crimes
involving “moral turpitude,” finding that this disqualification based on a criminal conviction had
been used, as intended, to discriminate against blacks). See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222
(1985).
90 See, e.g., Dan Froomkin, Republican Voter Suppression Campaign Rolls Back Early Voting,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/18/republican-votersuppression-early-voting_n_1766172.html; Tom Jacobs, How Polling Places Can Affect Your Vote,
PACIFIC STANDARD (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/howpolling-places-can-affect-your-vote-20318/ (showing the profound impact on voter turnout of even
small increased distances to the polls).
91 See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Shelby County. v. Holder: The Crippling of the Voting Rights Act,
ACSblog (June 27, 2013) http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/shelby-co-v-holder-the-crippling-of-thevoting-rights-act (stating that the decision divided along party lines).
92 See Rosen, supra note 82 (based on the conservative majority’s history of judicial activism on
voting rights issues, predicting that the Court will set an impossibly high threshold for proving
intentional discrimination under Section 2).
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in American history, whites will no longer comprise a majority of
Americans. 93 Under these conditions, racially polarized voting will become
an even greater threat to the current majority, and partisan pressures to
allow and engage in antidemocratic practices with racially discriminatory
effects are likely to increase. Predictably, these demographic shifts will serve
to heighten the trend toward disfigured democracy that our culture has
already experienced.
IV. CONCLUSION
As highlighted by the disparate perspectives revealed by Justice Scalia
and Justice Sotomayor during the oral argument in Shelby County. v. Holder
on the link between voting and “racial entitlement,” demography and
democracy remain intertwined. If a predictably divided Court continues to
decide racially and politically charged cases like Shelby County in the way
that it has, questions about the role of the Court’s partisanship will remain.
America’s shifting demographics make the question an increasingly
important one.
Damning circumstantial evidence suggests that, consciously or
unconsciously, partisan loyalty may be influencing not just election outcomes
but Supreme Court outcomes. 94 While circumstantial evidence is not proof,
perceptions of the Court’s political partisanship are understandable and
supportable. These perceptions erode the Court’s moral authority and cast a
dark shadow on our system of justice under law.
In a case like Shelby County, if the Court had advanced rather than
assaulted democratic values, regardless of the demographic implications,
these corrosive perceptions might have diminished to some degree. Instead,
they have grown, and belief in the integrity of our nation’s constitutional
design has plummeted. 95 Halting this downward spiral and restoring faith in
United States Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Projections Show a Slower Growing, Older,
More Diverse Nation a Half Century from Now, (Dec. 12, 2012),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb12-243.html (projecting that by
2043, there will be no white majority).
94 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Law in the Raw, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014) (in another context,
reluctantly concluding that the Supreme Court’s recent decision to hear King v. Burwell, despite
its pre-empting of an imminent rehearing by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
the absence of a circuit split, is “a naked power grab by the conservative justices who two years
ago just missed killing the Affordable Care Act in its cradle…There is simply no way to describe
[the decision to grant certiorari] as a neutral act.”).
95 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 82 (suggesting that even if Congress fixes the Voting Rights Act,
conservative Supreme Court majorities will likely thwart Congress’ intent again). See also
Richard L. Hasen, Supreme Error: North Carolina’s New Voter Suppression Law Shows Why the
Voting Rights Act is Still Necessary, SLATE (August 13, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/north_carolina_s_speedy_v
ote_suppression_tactics_show_exactly_why_the_voting.html (asking whether the Court’s majority
93
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our constitutional order may well require a Court of a different sort.
Climbing out of these cynical depths will be an extended process, but an
opportunity to begin will arise with the next Supreme Court opening.

anticipated that the Shelby County decision would deprive minority voters of effective means to
fight discrimination).
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